The Economics of Begging (submitted)

We provide the first large-scale evidence on the economics of begging, combining field observations with incentivized experiments involving over 2,000 beggars and donors in India. Guided by a signaling model in which donors give less when begging is by choice, we show that 31 percent of beggars use costly effort signaling by offering low-value items. Donors perceive these beggars as less labor-averse and give more. Yet, donors significantly overestimate the share of labor-averse beggars, while most beggars prefer paid work over free cash. Our findings suggest that reducing employment barriers may curb begging more effectively than fairness-driven legal restrictions.

Award: The Econometric Society’s Award for Best Paper in Applied Economics (Sharma, 2022)
Invited Seminars (2024): Harvard University, University of Chicago, Boston University, Brown University, Boston College, Tufts University
Conferences: ASSA-AEA Annual Meeting (2025), North East Universities Development Consortium (2024), Economic Science Association North America Meeting (2024), Theoretical Research in Economic Development (2024), Advances in Field Experiments (2024), Indian Statistical Institute Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development (2023, 2024), Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (2022, 2023)
Media: International Growth Center – Ideas for India, December 2024

The Persistence of Disadvantages: Theory and Experiment

Many economic situations involve contests for resources, such as winning prizes and earning bonuses. The likelihood of success in such contests is often skewed, favoring some competitors while putting others at a disadvantage. I study the strategic interaction between an advantaged and a disadvantaged competitor in a repeated contest where winning can help overcome the initial disadvantage. Theoretically, the competition for advantage increases effort by both competitors, but the advantaged competitor increases effort more than the disadvantaged competitor. As a result, the disadvantaged competitor is even less likely to win when they have the potential to overcome their disadvantage, and the initial disadvantage is persistent. Evidence from a laboratory experiment supports these theoretical predictions.

Invited Seminars: Monash University (2023), Bilkent University (2021)
Conferences: Behavioral Research in Economics – Economic Science Association Workshop (2022), Delhi School of Economics Winter School (2022), Indian Statistical Institute Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development (2022), Economic Science Association Global Meetings (2021), Southern Economic Association Meeting (2021), Contests: Theory and Evidence Conference (2020, 2021), Association for the Study of Religion Economics and Culture Conference (2019)

Can’t Agree to Disagree: Fairness Concerns and Conflict

Abstract: We study how concerns about fairness influence the relationship between income inequality and preference for conflict. Existing literature provides mixed results on whether inequality exacerbates conflict, where some find a positive effect while others fail to find any effect. We propose and test a fairness mechanism which addresses this discrepancy and suggests that conflict arises not solely from inequality but from disagreement over whether such inequality is merit-based (and thus fair) or luck-based (and thus unfair). When perceptions align and inequality is agreed on as fair or unfair, conflict remains minimal. However, disagreement over fairness perceptions leads to increased conflict over redistribution rights. Experimental evidence confirms the theoretical predictions.

Lawful Progress: Unveiling the Laws That Reshape Women’s Work Decisions

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of women’s legal rights on labor force participation decisions made by women and men through a granular analysis of 35 gendered laws. Building on previous literature, it departs from the analysis using aggregate indices due to concerns about (i) the usability of an index for policymaking purposes, (ii) the economic interpretation of an index’s average marginal effects, and (iii) the implicit assumption of homogeneous effects underlying regressions with an index. The findings identify nine key laws that can foster female labor force participation. Notably, laws related to household dynamics and women’s agency within the family, such as divorce and property rights laws, and laws regarding the ability of women to travel outside the home, are especially important in influencing their decision to work. The paper also shows that improving women’s legal rights does not negatively affect men’s participation in the labor force.

Conference: International Economic Association–World Bank Conference (2024)

Legal Barriers, Social Norms, and Returns to Women’s Economic Participation

Abstract: Women in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) have higher average cognitive abilities and legal gender equality than the global average, yet their economic participation is not higher. This paper investigates why, focusing on how legal reforms interact with social norms and returns to participation, driven by preferences and abilities, to shape labor force participation and entrepreneurship. Our dynamic model predicts that reforms are most effective where norms are less biased, norm sensitivity is low, and returns are high. Globally, the evidence supports the first two predictions: legal reforms yield greater gains in norm-egalitarian and low-sensitivity settings, while preferences and abilities show no significant interaction. In ECA, however, reforms interact negatively with biased norms (as predicted) but also negatively with preferences and abilities, suggesting a substitution effect rather than complementarity. These results indicate that in ECA, legal reforms must be paired with norm change and strategies to translate women’s capabilities into participation.