Research Fields
The Economics of Begging (Job Market Paper)
(with Samreen Malik)
Won the Econometric Society’s Best Paper Award in Applied Economics, 2022.
We collect novel data on begging activity and incentivized measures of preferences and perceptions of beggars and donors in India. Extensive field observations and experiments reveal three main empirical findings. First, about 30% of beggars use costly signaling, offering low-cost, low-value items to signal a preference for paid work, which increases donations by 35%, thus more than compensating for the costs of items. Second, 87% choose paid work over free cash, thus suggesting that begging is not a choice, and instead a consequence of limited access to employment, with its prevalence resistant to legal penalties or increased donor generosity. Third, donors have strong preferences for giving only in case of real need (when paid work is not an option), but they underestimate how many beggars actually prefer paid work. Viewed through the lens of our theoretical model, these misperceptions, combined with fairness preferences, result in suboptimal donations. Thus, addressing barriers to employment, rather than focusing on discouraging donations or legal punitive measures, may be more effective in reducing begging.
The Persistence of Disadvantages: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior
Many economic situations involve contests for resources, such as winning prizes and earning bonuses. The likelihood of success in such contests is often skewed, favoring some competitors while putting others at a disadvantage. I study the strategic interaction between an advantaged and a disadvantaged competitor in a repeated contest where winning can help overcome the initial disadvantage. Theoretically, the competition for advantage increases effort by both competitors, but the advantaged competitor increases effort more than the disadvantaged competitor. As a result, the disadvantaged competitor is even less likely to win when they have the potential to overcome their disadvantage, and the initial disadvantage is persistent. Evidence from a laboratory experiment supports these theoretical predictions.
Online Appendix
Can’t agree to disagree: Fairness Concerns and Conflict
(with Ernesto Reuben)
We examine how concerns about fairness influence the impact of income inequality on social conflict. While some studies suggest that inequality exacerbates conflict, others find no significant effects. We reconcile these discrepancies by introducing and testing a fairness mechanism that accounts for varying perceptions of income allocation. We hypothesize that conflict arises not merely from inequality, but from disagreement over whether such inequality is merit-based (and thus fair) or luck-based (and thus unfair). If inequality is universally perceived as either fair or unfair, conflict is minimal as income allocation is either accepted or peacefully renegotiated. However, when there is disagreement over perceptions over the source of inequality, conflict over the right to redistribute ensues. We test our theoretical results using a controlled laboratory experiment
Lawful Progress: Unveiling the Laws That Reshape Women’s Work Decisions
(with Anna Fruttero and Diego Gomes)
IMF Working Paper No. 2023/252
This paper examines the impact of women’s legal rights on labor force participation decisions made by women and men through a granular analysis of 35 gendered laws. Building on previous literature, it departs from the analysis using aggregate indices due to concerns about (i) the usability of an index for policymaking purposes, (ii) the economic interpretation of an index’s average marginal effects, and (iii) the implicit assumption of homogeneous effects underlying regressions with an index. The findings identify nine key laws that can foster female labor force participation. Notably, laws related to household dynamics and women’s agency within the family, such as divorce and property rights laws, and laws regarding the ability of women to travel outside the home, are especially important in influencing their decision to work. The paper also shows that improving women’s legal rights does not improve their labor force participation through a substitution effect as it has no systematic negative effect on men’s labor force participation.