Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, Irvine 2022
Master of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi 2014
Bachelor of Economics (Honors), University of Delhi 2011
Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Applied Microeconomic theory, Labor Economics, Political Economy
The Persistence of Disadvantages: Theory and Experiment (Under Review) Many economic situations involve contests for resources, such as winning prizes and earning bonuses. The likelihood of success in such contests is often skewed, favouring some competitors while putting others at a disadvantage. I study the strategic interaction between an advantaged and a disadvantaged competitor in a repeated contest where winning can help overcome the initial disadvantage. Theoretically, the competition for advantage increases effort by both competitors, but the advantaged competitor increases effort more than the disadvantaged competitor. As a result, the disadvantaged competitor is even less likely to win when they have the potential to overcome their disadvantage, and the initial disadvantage is persistent. Evidence from a laboratory experiment supports these theoretical predictions.
A signaling story of street charity: Theory and Field Evidence (joint with Samreen Malik) – Draft coming soon
Won the Econometric Society’s Award for Best Paper in Applied Economics, 2022 for an earlier solo-authored version of the paper. This paper examines the effect of offering a product on charitable behavior toward beggars on urban streets using a combination of theory and survey evidence. We propose a signaling model, which suggests that givers form beliefs about the intrinsic cost of working and willingness to earn based on the choice of begging with or without a product. In a separating equilibrium, the act of begging with a product separates the deserving from the undeserving and predicts higher charitable transfers to beggars with products. We use survey data collected in Delhi to find that the charitable transfers towards beggars with products are higher than towards beggars without products, even when givers did not take the product, indicating that the presence of a product does increase donations.
Which gendered laws matter for women’s economic empowerment? (joint with Anna Fruttero (WB) and Diego Gomes (IMF)) Approximately 2.4 billion working-age women are affected by unequal rights in their economies, as legal barriers in 176 countries hinder their economic participation. This paper focuses on the impact of women’s legal rights on their decision to work. Building on previous literature that used aggregate indices, we conduct an indicator-level analysis using the WBL and IMF databases from 1970. Our findings identify nine key laws that hold promise in reducing the gender gap in the labor force by increasing female labor force participation. Notably, laws related to household dynamics and women’s agency within the family play a particularly significant role in influencing their decision to work. Our research reveals no negative impact of improving women’s legal rights on male labor force participation.
Postdoctoral Research Scholar, Economics, New York University Abu Dhabi 2022–Present Fund Intern, Strategy, Policy and Review Department, International Monetary Fund 2021
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, UC Irvine Graduate level:
Microeconomic Theory 1 Fall 2018, 2019 , Microeconomic Theory 2 or Game theory Winter 2019, 2020 Undergraduate level:
Intermediate Microeconomics (Virtual) Spring 2021 , Probability Theory Fall 2016, Spring 2018, Spring 2019, Managerial Economics Winter 2018, Economics of Strategy Fall 2017, Basic Macroeconomics Spring 2017, Basic Microeconomics Winter 2017
Assistant Professor, Indian School of Business and Finance, London School of Economics and Political Science – International Center, New Delhi, India Introduction to Economics (Undergraduate Microeconomics and Macroeconomics) 2015-16